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Recasting South Asian Security
CHRIS OGDEN
This edited book recasts the interpretation of security and international relations (IR) in South Asia. By explicitly moving away from the 
traditional focus of most analyses upon India–Pakistan relations, the 
contributors recognise the unique confluence in the region of two of the 
international system’s rising great powers—China and India—and two 
of its failing and most unstable states—Pakistan and Afghanistan (Failed 
States Index 2013). This approach reasserts the region’s wider dynamics, 
both broadens and redefines our sense of South Asia, and underscores 
our increased need for regional understandings concerning its security and 
stability. The importance of this new emphasis has been heightened by 
the continued withdrawal of a variety of external actors from Afghanistan 
in 2014 and 2016. It is these factors, combined with improving our 
understanding of the role that major Asian powers can play to ensure 
mutual stability in South Asia, that are the chief analytical motivations 
for the research of this edited book.
To heighten our appreciation and understanding of these dynamics, 
the volume evaluates and compares the core norms (broadly defined as 
historically-derived values, principles and interests) underpinning the 
six bilateral relations present between the four indicated states. These 
theoretical foundations rest upon utilising a norm-based and identity-
driven account of security that scrutinises multiple norms simultaneously. 
Such an approach highlights the historical experiences of each state’s major 
political actors both in terms of how they perceive their own security, but 
also their relationship with other neighbouring states. It will be argued 
that these ideational factors provide a superior understanding of regional 
security dynamics by highlighting the impact of temporal factors (such as 
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history, experience and interaction) in the analysis of international relations 
in South Asia. Employing this methodology further indicates how norms 
can often have primacy over material, systemic and economic factors.
The six bilateral relations highlighted in this volume range from being 
very well-documented (between India–Pakistan, and India–China), to 
being well-established but under-researched (China–Pakistan), to being 
largely under investigated and relatively unknown (Afghanistan–Pakistan, 
India–Afghanistan and China–Afghanistan). Through an initial outlining 
of their historical state-to-state interaction (from the pre-1945 era through 
to the Cold War, post-Cold War, and post-9/11 periods), each expert 
contributor uses these foundations to analyse the core contemporary 
strategic norms and identities integral to each relationship. Through 
the direct bilateral comparison that is integral to the analytical focus of 
each chapter, the authors draw out points of convergence, divergence 
and ambiguity between their chosen protagonists. The conclusion then 
draws together the findings of each chapter, and synthesise them to show 
which key norms and interests are shared by all four regional actors. 
These commonalities will then be used to indicate (policy) pathways for 
enhancing regional cooperation and stability in the future.
After discussing the need for a new approach concerning the study 
of South Asia, and the imperatives central to such a recasting, this 
Introduction then details the theoretical framework of this volume. 
Resting upon the use of norms to highlight the centrality of history, 
interaction and experience to understanding the policy behaviour (and 
potential trajectory) of states, it provides a methodology for how such an 
analysis will be undertaken by the contributors to this edited book. The 
Introduction ends by outlining the volume’s structure, orientation and 
constituent chapters.
TOWARDS A NEW SOUTH ASIA
This volume highlights several dimensions critical to the study and 
investigation of contemporary South Asia. These dimensions in turn 
directly relate to our intended theoretical and empirical approach—
namely carrying out state-specific analyses that are historically rich and 
longitudinal in nature. This section pinpoints South Asia’s criticality in 
these regards, by focusing on; i) its historical relevance and contemporary 
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importance; ii) the presence of two rising and two falling states; iii) the 
importance of inter-connectivity concerning the analysis of collective 
dynamics rather than singular issues; and iv) the necessity for crafting 
a regional solution to regional issues. From this basis, there is a further 
acknowledgement that because of our regional to global emphasis, some 
South Asian relations are more critical than others. Given the volume’s 
focus and aims, there is therefore an implicit need to side-step any analysis 
of the relations of the smaller South Asian states, such as Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives.
South Asia’s importance has long been apparent within international 
affairs. Such a criticality has rested upon the sub-continent’s geo-strategic 
position as a bridge between East Asia and West Asia (the Middle East), 
whilst providing access northwards into Central Asia. The region also 
borders the oil rich Arabian Gulf, and physically dominates the Indian 
Ocean Region (IOR)—a crucial area for ensuring the energy and trade 
security of many states. In the nineteenth century, Afghanistan was 
central to strategic rivalries between Great Britain and Russia (the ‘Great 
Game’), whilst British India was regarded as the strategically essential 
‘Jewel of the Raj’. This significance continued through the Second World 
War, whereby India became a critical bulkhead against Japan’s westward 
expansion and for supplying nationalist forces in China. Here we can see 
South Asia’s importance to the short, medium and long terms interest of 
many states—strategically, economically and militarily; essences that have 
endured until the present day.
During the Cold War, the region maintained its relevance to global 
affairs. This centrality rested upon its proximity to one of the superpowers 
vying for supremacy (the Soviet Union) but also China and West Asia, 
which provided clear strategic benefits for the involvement of major 
external and regional actors. Oscillating Pakistan–US ties (and some India–
US linkages) from the 1950s, along with China’s alignment with Pakistan 
dating from the 1960s, and India’s 1970s tilt towards the Soviet Union, 
typified this inter-reliance. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and 
the US response to fund a proxy campaign via Pakistan to oust them, was 
further emblematic of such wider geo-political import. Although relatively 
neglected after the end of the Cold War, the emergence of the Taliban in 
Afghanistan in the 1990s, India and Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests, and the 
September 11 2001 (9/11) attacks that pre-cursored the US’s global ‘war 
on terror’ (and their invasion of Afghanistan), all reasserted South Asia’s 
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global centrality. An emergent New Great Game in Central Asia, centring 
upon the contestation for the region’s energy resources by Russia, China, 
the US and the European Union (EU), further underscores this prognosis.
Beyond this historical relevance, this research also acknowledges the 
region’s present status as being at the fulcrum of contemporary IR dynamics 
and global trends. These trends range from the phenomenon of rising great 
powers, the criticality of globalising liberal economics and the emergence 
of an Asian Century; to the threat posed by international terrorism, the 
instability caused by nuclear proliferation, and the need to manage energy 
security demands (particular for large transitioning economies). Through 
this volume’s collective approach, such factors again highlight how the 
underlying nature, current orientation and future trajectory of South 
Asian security are all of (mounting) significant to international affairs. 
These attributes also neatly fit with definitions of the region as a (nascent) 
security complex, whereby states ‘whose major processes of securitisation 
… are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be reasonably 
analyzed apart from one another’ (Buzan et al. 1997: 201). Thus, by 
re-conceptualising South Asia’s contemporary and ongoing relevance to 
global politics, we underscore the necessity for scholars and practitioners 
alike to achieve a better understanding of the region’s central relations. 
We attempt to recast South Asian security in a number of innovative 
ways. While various texts have considered South Asia from some of 
its various core bilateral perspectives (for example, India–Pakistan—
see Cohen 2010; Ganguly 1994; Paul 2005; India–China—Frankel 
and Harding 2004; Smith 2007; Winters and Yusuf 2007; Pakistan–
Afghanistan—Khan 2011; Gartenstein-Ross et al. 2010; Rashid 2009; 
and Pakistan–China—Small 2014), no analyses have yet focused upon a 
selection of these in a collective/inclusive manner. Scholars have also not 
fully acknowledged both Afghanistan and China as being critical factors for 
the long-term stability of the region, despite their clear inter-connections 
with India and Pakistan. This book thus brings both Afghanistan and China 
into the study of South Asian relations, whilst confirming the criticality of 
both—two of the international system’s largest and two of its most unstable 
states to regional politics. As per our recasting of South Asia as a larger 
region, it uses their inclusion to construct a deeper unified understanding 
of the strategic interests integral to regional security practices. 
Our analysis also specifically focuses upon the region’s internal 
dynamics, identities and trajectory as the primary mode of investigation, 
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rather than looking at specific issues in isolation—such as insecurity 
and terrorism (Barthwall-Datta 2012; Paul 2010) or nuclear and energy 
(Ebinger 2010; Lall 2008; Sagan 2009). Such a differing approach also 
applies to previous investigations that have rested upon describing 
regional institutions (for instance Chaudhury 2006; Dash 2008; Sáez 
2012) or overtly US/external perspectives (see Nye et al. 2011; Rashid 
2013; Riedel 2012). Instead, the writings in this volume derive new 
ways of conceptualising the region as a co-dependent entity, in order to 
lead to a more efficacious, detailed and realistic analysis of South Asia’s 
contemporary importance and its inherent challenges. This intellectual 
foundation further contrasts to seeing the region via the prevailing global 
context (as per the approaches undertaken in Hagerty 2005; Hewitt 1997) 
and instead insists upon a clearer inside-out perspective whereby South 
Asia security is a significant influence on the world rather than purely 
vice versa. 
Regarding the region as being inter-connected also pinpoints both 
positive and negative portents concerning relations between the major 
actors noted in this volume. On the more negative side, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan have become founts of regional instability via the mounting 
incidence of terrorism and insurgency within and across their borders. 
Such threats have periodically over-spilled beyond their boundaries, 
impacting upon both India and China and present major domestic security 
concerns, particularly in their Kashmir and Xinjiang regions respectively. 
More positively, both India and China are focused upon their mutual fiscal 
modernisations as a pathway to greater global influence and standing. 
Securing a peaceful neighbourhood is central to such aims, and Beijing and 
New Delhi’s continued economic success can have commensurate trade, 
internal stability and greater development benefits for all of the region’s 
actors. Heightening economic linkages, increasing levels of investment 
and forming regional associations can thus potentially inculcate greater 
prosperity, viability and self-sufficiency in a new South Asia.
Bolstered by the current exodus of various extra-regional powers from 
South Asia, we ask more fundamentally how the states analysed in the 
volume can be integral to any solution concerning regional stability. Unlike 
those actors who have only been involved intermittently in the region, 
for China and India the proximity of Pakistan and Afghanistan (and vice 
versa) makes them permanent features on their strategic horizons. This 
geographical reality underscores the need for a long-term vision for the 
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region that is mutually inclusive and mutually beneficial to those within 
it. Indicating common values, principles and interests is a key starting 
point to realising such a process, and underscores this volume’s emphasis 
upon normative conceptions as a means with which to understand the 
region’s six key state-to-state relations. Taken collectively, these six bilateral 
understandings can then be co-joined to facilitate a multi-dimensional 
appreciation of regional dynamics, and its intrinsic self-conceptions, 
interests and worldviews. Focusing upon identities and norms is the key 
theoretical approach to realising such an aim. 
IDENTITY AND NORMS
An identity-driven account of international relations is aimed at isolating 
and analysing the normative beliefs underpinning state security practice. 
Compared with more conventional accounts (that emphasise material 
and structural factors), this volume instead stresses the primacy of 
ideational factors in determining international affairs. These ideational 
factors (primarily identities and their composite norms) provide a 
superior understanding of regional security in the South Asian context 
by highlighting the impact of temporal factors, and successfully linking 
domestic ideologies with foreign policy behaviour. Focusing upon the 
dominant historically derived beliefs inherent to regional security, this 
analytical approach is dependent upon an appreciation of events and 
their historical chronology/frequency, as well as an understanding of 
foreign policy making from within our six highlighted states. As such, we 
predominantly place emphasis upon domestic/internal factors (within 
states and within South Asia) rather than on external determinants 
emanating from the international structure/system.
An emphasis on norms also counteracts those analyses that focus only 
on the immediate short-term repercussions of an event at that time rather 
than investigating how that event impacts throughout history. Through 
such presentism, there is little recognition of the dynamism of history, 
particularly in terms of how it is remembered and how this impacts on 
present and future policy practice. Indeed, most analyses insist upon the 
criticality of a certain singular event—the end of the Cold War or 9/11, 
for example—as a particular ‘turning point’ in a state’s security practice. 
Such approaches contrast to conceptualising the ongoing influence of 
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history as a whole on a state’s security policies, and explaining regional 
security as being in response to domestic influences. As such, this 
volume aims to see foreign policy and security behaviour as something 
embedded from experience and interaction, and dependent upon how 
states conceptualise themselves (their self-image) and others. Using 
norms thus acknowledges the domestic roots of security policy fanning 
outwards, and appreciating how its core principles have continued and 
changed over time and, critically, across different political leaders and 
different political generations.
Within international relations, constructivism provides the most 
fruitful avenue from which to situate our theoretical framework, given 
its focus upon history, domestic factors, learning, identity and norms. 
Our emphasis eschews any comparison with liberalism, which is largely 
based upon economic cooperation, multilateralism and the maximisation 
of interests (Baldwin 1993; Brown 2005; Weber 2004). It also differs 
from (most) realist accounts which treat states as identical ‘black boxes’ 
within an ahistorical and acultural setting (Glaser 1994/5: 55), whereby 
wider system-level/structural dynamics, balances of power (Walt, 1998: 
31) and ‘the distribution of objective material power capabilities’ (Legro 
and Moravcsik 1999: 34) predominant as the means to evaluate and 
determine state-to-state relations. Interests are generalised/fixed across 
states and ‘formed prior to any social interaction or historical evolution’ 
(Oros 2008: 29), indicating that realism in general cannot adequately 
account for change and evolution in the study of international affairs 
(Copeland 2000: 190). Most strands of realism are thus incompatible with 
the aims of this research, but it does however have some similarity with 
classical realism, which acknowledges how ‘identities and values (a)re more 
important determinants of policy than the constraints and opportunities 
of the external environment’ (Jackson et al. 2004: 346).
LOCATING NORMS: INTERACTION AND HISTORY
Constructivism is concerned with ideational factors (such as identities and 
norms) rather than with objective or material conditions. It is founded 
upon ‘a cognitive, inter-subjective conception of process in which 
identities and interests are endogenous to interaction’ (Wendt 1992: 394). 
Constructivists declare that states are social constructions based upon 
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historically contingent conceptions of the self, the international system and 
their mutual relationship. Intrinsic to this approach is the importance of 
exogenous and endogenous change whereby the previous interaction that 
has taken place in between the system’s states cannot be seen as ‘ahistorical 
givens’ (Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994: 232) but as precedents and 
normalising forces. This approach recognises the importance of continuity 
and change concerning the self-conceptualisation of states, how they 
regard the world around them, and how they behave inter-nationally. The 
interests and identities of states are thus not only specific to each state but 
are malleable through the temporal process of history. 
From this basis, the social-psychological milieu is noted to be of 
ongoing significance to international relations, as are its incumbent 
identities and norms, which are constructed and reconstructed through 
enduring social interaction. Through an emphasis on identity and the 
role of history, constructivism has the ability to theorise and analyse 
change by focusing upon ‘the dynamic, contingent and culturally based 
condition of the social world’ (Adler 2002: 96). Via precedent, interaction 
and experience, history has an indicatory strength along with an ability to 
isolate and explicate change rather than asserting a unitary realist viewpoint 
(Snyder 2004: 61). Furthermore, constructivism links and concurrently 
analyses domestic and international change (Koslowski and Kratochwil 
1994: 234; Zakaria 1992: 188). In turn, levels of analysis and agency-
structure debates are seen as relational and co-constitutive, rather than 
oppositional, forces (Checkel 1998: 325; Hay 2002: 127, 191)—again 
stressing interaction and change over stasis.
Constructivism uses norms to trace and structure its ideational 
accounts of international affairs. Norms can be defined as ‘intersubjective 
beliefs about the social … world that define actors, their situations, and 
the possibilities of action’ (Wendt 1995: 73–74). Norms can also be seen 
to represent ‘a particular set of interests and preferences’ (Hopf 1998b: 
175). These include regulative norms—norms that order/constrain 
behaviour and ‘are intended to have causal effects (such as) getting people 
to approximate the speed limit’ (Ruggie 1998: 871). In turn, constitutive 
norms ‘define an identity by specifying the actions that will cause Others 
to recognize that identity and respond to it appropriately’ (Hopf 1998b: 
173). Additionally, evaluative and prescriptive norms act to respectively 
assess and regulate social behaviour (Axelrod 1986: 1097). In this study 
focusing upon the security behaviours of particular states, our emphasis 
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is on regulatory and constitutive norms as encapsulating notions of 
continuity and change rather than any norms that are proscriptive or 
evaluative (moralistic) of practical action. 
Central to regulative and constitutive norms is experiential learning 
that underpins both the development and solidification of new or existing 
beliefs. This learning primarily stems from interaction, whereby states ‘not 
only accumulate experience but also learn from it’ (Gaddis 1992: 16). In 
turn, learning is a fluid behavioural guide inherent to preference formation 
as ‘which behaviours are conceivable, that is which norms are accepted, 
varies over time’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 366). Therefore, ‘norms 
constitute social identities and give national interests their content and 
meaning’ (Adler 2002: 103), whilst presenting shared ideas as a causal 
force separate from material structures (Copeland 2000: 189–90). Both 
states and the international system are constructed through interaction. 
Furthermore, interaction highlights dominant values and beliefs that then 
become norms, and which in turn structure identities. From this basis, 
and as Hopf notes, ‘by providing meaning, identities reduce uncertainty’ 
(quoted in Duffield et al. 1999: 167) and act as ordering mechanisms of 
constitutive norms.
Within the context of six specific bilateral relationships, the overarching 
focus of this volume is ‘a concern with explaining the evolution and 
impact of norms on national and international security’ (Farrell 2002: 
72). Through a focus upon internal factors concerning the delineation 
of security policy, encompassing the viewpoints of policymakers/elites 
from the capitals of our core states—Beijing, Islamabad, Kabul and New 
Delhi—will give them greater prominence and credence, allowing for 
our analysis to embrace clear state- and region-specific perspectives. 
In turn, the varied backgrounds of this volume’s contributors also adds 
extra nuance to this approach. Furthermore, by drawing out the range of 
interaction between states across many decades, our contributors will be 
able to isolate, determine and analyse ‘which norms matter, why and how’ 
(Risse and Sikkink 1999: 236). Via a norm-based framework of analysis, 
such a state-focused and state-driven approach will unveil how security 
in a new South Asia is not only highly inter-connected but is also deeply 
co-dependent in terms of its provenance and orientation.
Norms are the core components of state identities and specify the 
practices associated with that identity, not only through their recording 
of interaction and experience but also their indication of interests. It is 
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interaction that leads to the formation of norms, encouraging ‘certain 
dispositions and orientations whilst opposing and de-legitimising 
others—a process that is neither deterministic in its operation nor totally 
hegemonic in its consequences’ (Campbell 1992: 10). Consequently, 
norms are essentially collective meanings that guide state-to-state 
behaviour through their constitution of social knowledge that establishes 
the rules and practice dictating interaction. State identities are thus 
compound entities, ‘socially constructed by knowledgeable practice’ 
(Wendt 1992: 392). History traces interaction and is the process by which 
both interaction and experience are recorded and recollected. Formative 
interaction shapes international history, providing the defining inference 
points of what states are. Thus, history (and its recollection) is the kinetic 
force behind norm continuity and change, whereby ‘history is a process 
of change that leaves an imprint on state identity’ (Katzenstein 1996: 23), 
and thus on security policy. Importantly, history is not a collection of facts 
but a collection of interpretations whereby meaning and importance are 
attached to events, and is a distilled stimulus upon norm-based analyses. 
History is also overarching, linking together different historical eras and 
encompassing various specific events.
Adding to these important socialising forces, notions of self/other 
capture where and how identities diverge. The logic of identity requires the 
ascription of boundaries that enable comparison and difference, meaning 
that no definition of the self can be asserted ‘without suppositions about 
the other’ (Campbell 1992: 70). Furthermore, the importance of self/other 
to a norm-based account of security is that it is ‘the medium by which they 
[states] determine who they are, what they want and how they should 
behave’ (Wendt 1999: 332). This pinpointing allows for ‘the construction of 
various mutually reinforcing dichotomies’ (Campbell 1992: 65) that stratify 
distinctions between actors and their related security interests. Security 
is also dependent upon how states read the internal self-images of other 
states (Nau 2003: 220), ideas salient to the formation of threat perceptions 
based upon fear and differentiation of core strategic interests. Conversely, 
comparison investigates similarities and can lead to cooperation and inter-
dependence via mutual identification, as evidenced by the presence of 
shared normative beliefs. A visual conception that is emblematic of these 
major themes, and which highlights the interplay of norms across political, 
physical and perceptual dimensions can be seen below.
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Through these key socialising forces, the analysis in each chapter will 
be able to derive a detailed understanding of the security practice of the 
two states in each bilateral pairing. Deploying a longitudinal lens of analysis 
is essential, and will primarily date from the 1940s when the majority of 
our four states began their modern incarnations (Pakistan and India in 
1947, and China in 1949). Our norm-based approach will thus show how 
interaction and experience have impacted upon regional security practice 
across a long time period. Some of this interaction may be positive, built 
upon close collaborative ties and shared threat perceptions (such as in 
Pakistan–China relations) or negative; based upon continued enmity, 
punctuated by repeated conflict and a mutual demonisation (as between 
India and Pakistan). Importantly a norm-based framework of analysis 
allows us to see how relationships fluctuate over time, how states learn 
from each other and how their short, medium and long-term interests 
evolve in response to domestic, regional and systemic determinants. Self-
image, social differentiation and social similarity will also be evident, as 
identities and their incumbent norms variously compete and coalesce 
with each other. 
FIGURE 1 Security Identity Framework 
Source: Ogden (2014: 15).
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Jervis notes, ‘historical traumas can heavily in! uence future perceptions’ 
(1969: 470), as will be evident in India concerning Partition in 1947 
for her attitude towards Pakistan or vis-à-vis the 1962 war concerning 
China relations. When and how the norms structuring the normative 
sources of security have be n threatened indicates their relevance to 
a state’s security identity. History is critical in this regard as it acts as a 
chronological tool (and temporal manager) that traces a state’s interaction, 
represents recorded dynamism, and provides a depository of experience 
















 FIGURE I.1 Conceptualizing the security identity framework (with reference to 






Each chapter will investigate in turn one of the six key bilateral relationships. 
In Chapter 1, David Scott analyses the India–China relationship through 
a three-fold prism of historical origins, contemporary essence and 
future trajectory. He argues that at the global and rhetorical level there 
is convergence of values, but at the regional level there is a significant 
norm divergence and geo-political competition, along with the issue of 
whether or not a democratic China will eventually emerge. In chapter 2, 
Michael Semple gives an account of the evolution of Afghanistan–Pakistan 
state-to-state relations since the 1947 foundation of Pakistan, along with 
a parallel narrative of economic, social and cultural relations between the 
populations on either side of the Durand Line. The chapter demonstrates 
that the state-to-state relations have been adversarial through much of the 
period, despite many elements of commonality and significant levels of 
cross-border interaction.
In chapter 3, Runa Das depicts perceptions of India and Pakistan’s 
insecurities as being ideologically and discursively interpreted, which 
have—in conjunction with regional, global, domestic, historical, and 
technological factors—created a complex political-ideological context. 
Her analysis recasts the dynamics of the insecurities inherent to India–
Pakistan relations from a more non-traditional angle and draws attention 
to how the ideological underpinnings of policymakers impact inter-state/
regional nuclear security affairs. In chapter 4, Jingdong Yuan shows how 
China’s relations with Afghanistan have remained largely limited, low-
profile and stable, as Beijing’s policy approaches to its war-torn Central 
Asian neighbour have been largely cautious and aloof. He notes that 
relations are predominantly focused on resource development projects 
and how they will affect China’s northwestern region of Xinjiang, where 
ethnic issues remain one of the core security concerns for the Chinese 
central government. 
In chapter 5, Andrew Small evaluates how the China–Pakistan 
relationship has evolved in light of internal security problems in Pakistan 
and China’s fears over broader instability in the region. Critically, he 
traces how the rise of the Pakistani Taliban, tensions in Xinjiang, and 
the anticipated US withdrawal from Afghanistan have all placed China’s 
concerns about Islamic militancy as the principal new factor in relations. 
In chapter 6, Avinash Paliwal and Harsh V. Pant then demonstrate how 
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India has tried to be active in Afghanistan since the 2001 fall of the Taliban 
and how a broad-based interaction is taking place between the two states, 
based upon the forging of economic, military and institutional linkages. 
They observe that a combination of material and ideational factors present 
a fuller account of the way Indian policy towards Afghanistan has evolved, 
as well as the challenges that it poses.
Overall, it is through an emphasis upon constructivist accounts within 
international relations, that our analytical framework will highlight the 
norms central to the security practices of Afghanistan, China, India and 
Pakistan via the interplay of their various bilateral affairs. Accentuating 
ideational and interactional elements (as opposed to material and generalist 
considerations), history, learning and self/other dichotomies will all be 
critical processes underpinning this normative approach. Tracing the 
formation and solidification of multiple security norms via a rich empirical 
account (through the detailed use of primary and secondary sources), 
each chapter will delineate these norms for each state based upon three 
key parameters. From this basis, a direct comparison and evaluation of 
state-to-state relations in each bilateral pairing—as derived from their 
composite norms and worldviews—will be realised. Carrying out our 
analysis over the same historical period will furthermore isolate different 
state responses to the same (structural) events, validating the strength of 
an ideational account of security in South Asia.
From this basis, the conclusion will merge the findings of our six 
analytical chapters, so as to produce indications of regional commonalities 
from which greater stability may be derived. Referencing how history 
can be utilised as a ‘conscious effort to place actions of the past into a 
coherent explanation of use to the present’ (Hill quoted in Gong 2001: 
xii), we find that both China and India—potentially through collective 
action—are the best placed regional actors to inspire a more settled future 
for South Asia. Thus, their shared Panchsheel values, along with mounting 
global great power statuses co-joined with growing economic prowess, all 
provide clear motivations for them to act together. We also note though 
that the role of their relative relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan 
adds some complexity to accomplishing such a synergy, especially given 
the historically (and contemporarily) fraught nature of India’s relations 
with the latter state, although these can possibly be balanced out through 
Beijing’s ever close ties with Islamabad.
